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LAW AND ECOLOGICAL ETHICS
SYMPOSIUM
Each new day seems to present a fresh ecological disaster or
threat. There is a crude Newtonian dynamic at work. For each new
technological action, there seems to be an equivalent adverse reaction
on the delicate equilibrium of ecosystems. Whether it be the ravages of
acid rain or the slaughter of wild animals, there are constant and pain-
ful reminders of the fragility and finitude of ecological systems. More
pertinently, such issues force the legal community to address its role
and responsibilities in preserving and promoting the delicate ecological
balance. In this regard, this symposium on law and ecological ethics is
timely; the need to establish adequate and fruitful theoretical bases for
political and legal action is paramount.
Although the ecological debate is perennial, the contribution of the
legal community was for so long undistinguished. However, ten years
ago, Christopher Stone' and Lawrence Tribe2 injected a powerful dose
of inspirational theorizing into environmental law scholarship. Both au-
thors demanded a fresh approach to thinking about and responding to
rampant environmental devastation; they advocated an extension of
moral and legal rights to non-human entities. The intervening decade
has underlined the seriousness of the predicament and the urgent need
for coherent ecological philosophies. The modest ambition of the four
symposiasts is to advance that debate. Despite their disagreement over
appropriate directions for reform and progress, there is agreement that
the ecological crisis is as much about ideas as action.3 They share John
Stuart Mill's view that there will be no great improvement in the gen-
eral ecological condition until great changes take place in our modes of
thought.4
The symposiasts agree that it is inappropriate to extend rights dis-
course to the ecological debate. As a self-styled "shallow ecologist,"
P.S. Elder argues that conventional legal and ethical theorizing, albeit
in a more rigorous and invigorated form, can resolve ecological dilem-
mas; "careful analysis and tireless political action are both badly
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needed."'5 The other contributors are less sanguine. Directing his atten-
tion to the current demand for a greater recognition of animal rights,
Mark Sagoff teases out the contradictory and confusing moral basis fdr
such claims. Indeed, he concludes that "[t]he liberationist. . . must be
willing, in principle, to sacrifice the authenticity, integrity, and com-
plexity of ecosystems to protect the rights .. .of animals."6 Sagoff
opts for a more holistic concern for nature. In a more radical essay,
John Livingston contends that rights are a peculiarly human pre-occu-
pation; to give rights to animals would only serve to extend human
structures of power and domination. For him, the call for animal rights
is humanistic imperialism at its hypocritical worst. Moreover, he main-
tains that environmental destruction "may have no remedies in the
Western cultural tradition."17 Finally, Paul Emond makes a modest, but
constructive attempt to lay a "new" basis for environmental law. In-
spired by, but ultimately rejecting, the ideas of Stone and Tribe, he
argues that rights are essentially hollow. In place of the prevailing an-
thropocentrism, he advocates a co-operative approach: "dominance,
control, and the ethic of need and greed must give way to empathy,
tolerance and the ethic of care and share."8
In his own way, each author reaffirms the belief that there is noth-
ing so practical as a good theory. If we are to stave off or respond
sensibly to ecological disasters, we must radically re-think our own self-
image. We cannot persist in our homocentric arrogance: we need na-
ture much more than it needs us. In transforming ecological philoso-
phy, we must strive for a gracious humility. A radically revised ecologi-
cal vision of ourselves as humans-on-earth is the first step to putting the
world on a better and more secure footing. Environmental despoilation
is not simply the result of acid rain, but the way we think about acid
rain. This symposium is devoted to the amelioration of that situation.
The words of Paul Shepard eloquently define the challenge:
The conventional image of man, like that of the heraldic lion, is iconographic; its
outlines are stylized to fit the fixed curves of our vision. We are hidden from
ourselves by habits of perception ... If nature is not a prison and earth a
shoddy way-station, we must find the faith and force to affirm its metabolism as
Elder, Legal Rights For Nature: The Wrong Answer To The Right(s) Question (1984), 22
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our own - or rather, our own as part of it. To do so means nothing less than a
shift in our whole frame of reference and our attitude towards life itself.9
Allan C. Hutchinson
Editor-in-Chief
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
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